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[Nettime-bold] Melinda Cooper: The Catastrophic Enemy |
(posted to nettime with permission of the author /geert) From: "Melinda COOPER" <Melinda.COOPER@scmp.mq.edu.au> THE CATASTROPHIC ENEMY FROM THE EXCEPTION TO THE EMERGENCY By Melinda Cooper Theorists of defence have begun to redefine the cartography of war precisely in line with the shifting contours of world order we discussed earlier. This transformation is already made explicit in a collection of works edited in the US in 1997, called Complexity, Global Politics and National Security, where defence theorists respond to the "non linear" approaches to world economics with an equally "non linear" theory of warfare. This and other studies of its kind can be situated in the context of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) of the 90s, a policy reform initiated in the US that sought to rethink warfare in line with contemporary developments in information technology, business organization and complexity theory.[i] In the post-Cold War period, one theorist argues, war must be refigured in terms of "other non linear dynamical systems such as . commerce."[ii] Taking the liberal imperative of security to its extreme conclusion, these theorists envisage war as a police intervention of global reach, one which operates within the space of global economic flows, and at the same speed, in order to secure and foster its freedom of movement. War, it is suggested, needs to be understood as a constant and ubiquitous capacity to adapt to crisis, as uncertain and uncontrollable as its space of manoeuvre and, we must assume, as permanently mobilized as the threat of financial crisis. It is no accident then that recent defence theory is beginning to refigure the enemy precisely in the form of catastrophic risk rather than the sovereign exception or justus hostis, with its exclusive reference to the political order of the state. Even before September 11, defence theorists had begun to develop the concept of "catastrophic terrorism" as the paradigmatic threat of the post-Cold War era, with its breakdown of sovereign state confrontation. In a text written after September 11, the specialist in terrorism studies, Ashton B. Carter, sets out a point by point distinction between the logistics of war, understood in the traditional (and Schmittian) sense of war between sovereign states or civil war within the state, and terroristic threats. For Carter, the terrorist is neither the internal enemy of civil war or the external state. "Neither model" he writes, "encompasses the transnational drifter that is characteristic of the Al-Quaeda operative."[iii] Perhaps then, he suggests, terrorism should be treated not as warfare in the traditional sense but as a crime (Schmitt, for example, was already pointing to the trend towards the criminalization of the enemy in the wake of the Second World War). But here again the concept of crime implies a particular juridical model of responsibility, the imputation of guilt and the pronouncement of punishment, whereas what is at issue, according to Carter, is something more akin to a risk than a crime. The concept of catastrophic terrorism, in other words, assumes that the threat is somehow ineradicable and can therefore be at best anticipated, calculated and prevented rather than definitively purged. This last consideration leads Carter to raise the question whether terrorism should be considered as a catastrophe of the same order as a natural emergency, and he points out that early in the Bush administration, the task of responding to catastrophic terrorism was actually assigned to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. However, this response too, he argues, fails to grasp the precise nature of the risk at hand. If the terrorist threat is catastrophic, Carter seems to suggest, it is of the order of a social catastrophe, one that becomes effective precisely in the space of relations defined by global capital flow. In the last instance, Carter raises the question whether terrorism thus defined (and defence against terrorism) can be considered as war in the traditional sense of the term. If we turn to Schmitt's political philosophy, the response can only be negative, since he defines war solely in relation to the juridical order of the state. Perhaps one way of responding to this question would be to revive the concept of the state-of-emergency which Schmitt distinguishes from the state of exception. The translator, Georges Schwab, notes that in Schmitt's political philosophy, the "exception presupposes a constitutional order," that of the sovereign state and the Ius publicum Europeum governing international relations, whereas "a state of emergency need not have an existing order."[iv] For Schmitt, the emergency corresponds to a pre-juridical chaos, not even included in the law in the mode of exception. "There is no norm applicable to chaos," he writes in the Political Theology, no politics of the emergency.[v] The exception, on the other hand, is "distinguishable from a juristic chaos," for although law recedes when the exception is declared, the order of the state survives as a pure force of decision.[vi] It is precisely this equation between the decision, war and the state, however, that recent defence theory is putting into question. It is no accident that contemporary theories of non-linear dynamics are developing the intuition that chaos itself doesn't exclude order, that the disorder of economic chaos is what must needs to be theorized according to its own laws. If Schmitt's formulations seem inadequate to our contemporary predicament it is because the autonomisation of economic exchange from the decisional power of the state is such that we appear to have entered into a state of generalized chaos irrecuperable within the juridical order of the sovereign, but nevertheless theorizable on its own terms.[vii] This is a situation in which the economic accident, the element of ontological risk at the core of the liberal philosophy of freedom, becomes catastrophic. The project of global economic deregulation could be characterized, in the first instance, as the generalization of a permanent state of economic emergency. But in spite of Schmitt this process needs to be understood as something other than a pre-political, pre-juridical chaos. The globalisation of economic risk would not have been possible without the reinvention of juridical and political forms and even a transformation of the conditions of war. As contemporary theorists of non-linear dynamics have discovered, chaos is not without its laws. What is notable about the terrorism as a figure of enmity is the fact that it is defined first and foremost in terms of affective terms, by the intense fear it engenders, rather than the juridical language of the justa causa or justis hostis of the medieval and modern periods. As Luhmann has noted, in the discourse of classical liberalism, fear enters into the constitutive space of politics; fear can't be prohibited or suspended by the protection of a juridical order, rather it is fear that justifies the institution of laws and the declaration of war.[viii] As Ewald notes, the catastrophic risk of neoliberalism "[has an allusive, insidious potential existence that renders it simultaneously present and absent, doubtful and suspicious. Assumed to be everywhere, it founds a politics of prevention. The term prevention does not indicate simply a practice based on the maxim that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, but also the assumption that if prevention is necessary it is because danger exists - it exists in a virtual state before being actualised in an offense, injury, or accident." [ix] War, we are told, needs to become preemptive, if we are to counter the risk of terror, even if it is only a presumed threat. It is because we are afraid that the necessity of war is unanswerable. Your insecurity requires security. The catastrophic threat of terrorism, and the response it meets with, are indeed forms of war, but war which declares itself first and foremost as a state-of-emergency in excess of the juridical authority of the state, rather than the sovereign state-of-exception. Even the threatened war against Iraq, which would seem to evoke the most traditional concepts of the justa causa and all the paraphernalia of sovereign war, draws its legitimacy from the declaration of a prior state of emergency - the so-called war on terror. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the "insecurity of our times" has come to justify everything from the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan to "low intensity" warfare against internal "terrorist threats" around the world, to the introduction of exceptional police powers in almost all nation-states, to a planned preemptive strike on Iraq. A return to events preceding September 11, however, might help us to establish another chronology. In March 2000, the euphoria of the New Economy, encapsulating neoliberalism's flight into ever-increasing growth, came crashing to the ground when the dotcom stocks collapsed. At the end of 2000, a massive mobilization of anti-capitalist protestors in Seattle brought the WTO meeting to a halt - an event which brought the anti-IMF riots to the North and signified the emergence of a truly transnational opposition to neoliberal globalism. It was in this atmosphere of impending political and economic crisis, announcing the decline of the neoliberal triumphalism of the 80s and 90s, that Bush came to power. In May 2001, the Bush administration released its international energy policy paper, known as the Cheney report. Pointing to the growing reliance of the US on foreign oil supplies, the report called for a strengthening of the US presence in the Middle East as well as the diversification of supply sources to other oil-producing regions around the world. In the same year, a report coordinated by the Minister of Defence called for increased investment in the "RMA." In the wake of September 11, the defence and oil-supply strategies of the Bush administration have become increasingly difficult to distinguish. In the name of the "war on terror" the US military has proceeded to carry out precisely those incursions into Middle Eastern and Central Asian oil producing regions that the trade and foreign policy report of May 2001 had foreseen. As one commentator has pointed out, the three security priorities of the US government - increased military capacity, the search for new sources of oil and the war against terrorism - have now merged into one strategic objective.[x] This convergence of military and economic interests should no doubt be seen as a response to the crisis-ridden new economy. In this respect, the fate of the energy giant Enron, the major fundraiser to Bush's election campaign, is exemplary. The authors of the Cheney report had initiated dealings with Enron prior to its publication, promising it a major share in US-controlled oil regions. Enron was the very model of the new economy success story: It was the symbol of the New Economy and of the deregulation of both finance and energy markets. Its former CEO, Jeffrey K. Skilling, promoted the idea that assets were not what made a company valuable. Instead what counted was a company's intellectual capital. He sold the idea of Enron as a nimble, highly-leveraged, "asset-light" company engaged in aggressive internet-based trading. The point is that this huge and highly regarded company did not make anything. Nor did it perform a service like distributing energy. It was in essence a purely speculative enterprise, making money through trading made possible by the deregulation of a basic consumer need (electricity)." [xi] Unfortunately, a sudden turn in the market brought Enron crashing to the ground before the US manoeuvres in the Middle East could secure its future. The "war on terror" can be interpreted as a preemptive response to the fragility of the New Economy, an attempt to divert looming crisis by turning the beleaguered information sectors to defence purposes and tightening the strong-hold on oil reserves in order to insure the future of the "asset-light" multinational. The situation is one in which the state of permanent crisis induced by economic deregulation dictates the imperialist strategy of land appropriation. As Christian Marazzi puts it, "war is the continuation of the New Economy by other means."[xii] Since September 11 in particular, it has become clear that the generalisation of economic crisis through the 80s and 90s has found its counterpart in the "war on terror," the declaration of an all-pervasive and seemingly unending state of military emergency, permanently mobilized against a catastrophic, and alarmingly volatile threat. --------------- [i] For a detailed and penetrating analysis of the RMA, see Dillon and Reid, 2001, 58-66. Dillon and Reid note that, "[w]hereas for Clausewitz, war was the extension of politics by other means, for these new strategists the practice of war has become the extension of that form of wealth creation which also operates around information as a generative principle and prized commodity. Successful organization of war mimics successful organization of profit. (.) Just as successful organization for profit is dependent upon the radical relationality of effective network organization, so also is the effective use of lethal military force. Biopolitical economy is war pursued by other means." (64-65) [ii] John F. Schmitt 1997, 220. [iii] 2002, 7. [iv] Translator's footnote, in Schmitt 1985, 5. [v] 1985, 13. [vi] 1985, 14, 12. [vii] The assertion that the world (dis)order of neo-liberalism can be described as "chaos" has become a commonplace of recent political theory. But here again the antinomy between liberal and sovereigntist conceptions of "chaos" needs to be highlighted. Alain Joxe's recent book Empire of Disorder is notable for having revived a strictly Hobbesian vision of chaos, a move which in turn leads him to call for a strictly Hobbesian and Schmittian solution to our current predicament. "In the absence of a declared enemy, the most formidable enemy one must face in politics is disorder. Chaos comes first; the ordered world is second and always under threat" (118); ". order is always necessary because it provides protection" (122). [viii] Luhmann . [ix] 1993, 221-222. [x] Michael Klare 2002, 17. [xi] "Notes from the Editors," Monthly Review, Volume 53, Number 9. [xii] 2002, 154. _______________________________________________ Nettime-bold mailing list Nettime-bold@nettime.org http://amsterdam.nettime.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nettime-bold