Marina Grzinic (by way of Pit Schultz <pit@contrib.de>) on Fri, 6 Dec 96 01:03 MET |
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nettime: Hysteria: Physical Presence and Juridical Absence & AIDS |
Hysteria: Physical Presence and Juridical Absence & AIDS by Marina Grzinic, Ljubljana In the following essay I will examine the terms "presence" and its counterpart "absence" from two perspectives1. First, from a historical perspective, as historical constructions, situated within the framework of contemporary discourses, practices, and uses. My question is how this binary pair (which has played one of the central roles in post-structuralist theory) is to be conceived today and to what an extent it differs from that of nineteenth century? I will approach these binary terms within the discursive spaces and representational systems of the nineteenth and twentieth century in order to better grasp the roll they play, the assumptions they have fostered, and the belief systems they have confirmed. Second, I will approach the duality of presence and absence semiotically, as part of a larger system of visual and representational communication, as both a conduit and an agent of ideologies, as a sign system which contains a contingency of visual and signifying codes which in turn determine reception and instrumentality. To grasp the politics of representation of presence/absence I will relocate it within the discursive spaces and representational systems of two illnesses: hysteria and AIDS, each of these illnesses representing the illness par excellence of a specific century (nineteenth the former and twentieth century the latter). These illnesses are, as I intend to show, not only in relation to the duality of presence and absence, but moreover through specific ways of their representational politics they function as a part of a larger visual-communication and social system. Two other important implications are present in my decision as to why hysteria and AIDS were chosen. First, I chose hysteria, because of the linkage of this illness to women - hysteria embodied the mainstream male image of a woman2, while AIDS is overtly connected to another discrimination mainstream image, to that of homosexuals. Both illnesses are used to describe fantasmatic and marginalized correspondences, acknowledging also specific historical conditions. Second, because of my interest to analyze the binary terms of presence/absence in connection with the way in which these terms correspond with a specific representational strategy, one representing the human body (i.e. representations of historically, gender and class-determined bodies). Hysteria, the illness of incongruence of image and thought, was recognized as illness only through making visible the woman's hysterical body. AIDS, the illness par excellence of our times, because of specific representational techniques practiced in the media for the general public, coincides with new media technologies, virtual environments and/or cyberspace. All of them appear to be insisting on and fostering the erasure of the body. My thesis is that the mass media techniques of representations of AIDS are fostering the absence of the "real" ill body, similarly to the way contemporaneity is fostering the disembodiment of the subject within new media technologies. Never, or rarely, it is possible to see film documentaries of persons ill with, or dying of AIDS. This process has gone so far today, that one of the theoretical options of investigation of the politics of representation of our present is to find ways to put the body back into the picture.3 In the last part of this essay I will try to synthesize different interplays between presence/absence and hysteria/AIDS by using the semiotic square, a technique of discursive analysis, developed by A. J. Greimas. The semiotic square was designed to disclose the implications inherent to such binary relationships, thus helping to make explicit the "hidden" meanings which "stabilize" and generate significance. I. Hysteria: Physical Presence and Juridical Absence The first part of the title of this essay refers to a formulation which appears in Norman Bryson's study The Logic of the Gaze. There Bryson is interpreting the work of Theodore Gˇricault, who, in the beginning of the nineteenth century (1822-23), studied the influence of mental states on the human face and believed that the face accurately revealed the inner character, particularly in dementia and in cases of instant death. He made studies of inmates in hospitals and institutions for the criminally insane, where he himself spent time as a patient. Bryson claimed that if the historic purpose of the portrait genre is to record a precise social position, a particular instance of status in the hierarchy of power, than Gˇricault's portraits of insane people, from the first moment, exhibited a contradiction. For Bryson the portrait of the insane is, therefore, an impossible object, a categorical scandal, since the insane are those who have been displaced from any social hierarchy, who cannot be located on a social map, whose portraits thus cannot be painted. Bryson concluded that Gˇricault fused the categories of privilege and social void, society and asylum, physical presence and juridical absence.4 Martin Charcot's photographs of the hysterical patients taken at Salpetriere hospital (1877-80) had the same purpose.5 Because the underlying pathology of hysteria is invisible, Charcot doubted that hysteria was a disease at all. For him, hysteria was a problem of representation - the incongruence of image and thought, a disease occasioned by a problem of representation. To anchor this mobile disease Charcot enlisted the aid of photography. With photographs of the hysterics Charcot attempted to make visible this disease that could not be acknowledged except through behavior or representations.6 Just as Charcot's photographs, Gˇricault's previous studies functioned "as the institution of the subject, in this case of the insane persons, within the visible" 7. This institution of the subject within the visible was done according to a precisely chosen representational mode of the epoch - photography - therefore using modes and techniques that overdetermined visibility in a more general way within the discussed period. The categories of absence and presence are thus in a dual relation to the institution of the subject within the visible. Joan Copjec points out that hysteria, an illness of the imagination, threatened knowledge and in confusing categories of real and unreal illnesses, true perception and false images, made the physician a potential victim of trickery and deception, casting doubt on his senses that were the foundation of his knowledge.8 The issue therefore was not only to discover the relation between representations and hysteria, but to use the most appropriate regime of representation for such a kind of instauration. Photography, then being theorized as both the outcome and in service of positivism - objective, unmediated, actually imprinted by the light rays of the original form - was the ideal representational mode to be used in bringing the disease into a discursive construction.9 But this was happening in the nineteenth century, so what are these processes like today? I will make a parallel between the categories of absence/presence and different systems of representation with regard to AIDS, the illness par excellence of our time, attempting in this way to chart the process of the institution of the subject within the visible. AIDS also presents the problem of homogenous representation and depiction - the incongruence of both the image and the gaze. In the case of AIDS, in opposition to hysteria, the underlying pathology of the illness is horribly visible, and the whole process of representation and visibility is therefore operating differently, trying to erase and/or hide the conspicuous nature of the illness. The "identification" of the spectator with an ill person or with the AIDS disease is transferred to a metonymy, whose purpose is to hide the presence of the "real" ill body. Those persons who are afflicted with AIDS are in general listened to, rather than looked at. An artistic articulation of the above thesis is the feature film Blue, directed by Derek Jarman in 1993. For 75 minutes a blue screen is shown in front of the spectator. It is the sole image throughout the film, which provides a canvas for the audience, listening to evocative words, music and sounds. There are various ways of displaying the text in the film: inner speech, repetitious preoccupying phrases, or unconscious spoken thoughts.10 But my interest here lies not in a sociological reading or reinterpretation of the text in the film, but in the representational system superimposing, depicting the text in the film, on the blue colored canvas11. In Jarman's film the institution of the subject within the visible is presented by the disembodied voice of an ill person who is deliriously speaking throughout the film, anchoring the disease into the field of discourse. If we make a parallel between this regime and the one depicting hysteria, we can state that AIDS is represented with the physical absence of an actually ill body, but with a strong request through the text in the film for the juridical (judicial) presence, for the legal rights in different segments of society which are crossing or bordering the ill body. Another such an example is a mainstream film about AIDS - Philadelphia (directed by Jonathan Demme in 1994). In it Tom Hanks portrays a character who is a pale image of a real AIDS patient. In spite of having on the level of presentation the absence of an "authentically ill body", we nevertheless see on the other hand in this particular film also a clear fight for a juridical presence, for the rights pertaining to juridical proceedings of the persons inflicted with AIDS, especially homosexuals.12 The binary terms of presence-absence in relation to the representation of the body and its social counterpart in the juridical system culminate in two ways simultaneously: through technological interventions and discursive practices. It is possible though, to conceive the relation of a social space in which collision of bodies and reproduction technology (photography, film) takes place within the politics of power as it functions through the juridical system. Such a relation is also that between the invention/discovery of photography and the logic of the photograph's regime of representation and hysteria on the one side, and the invention of new technologies and media and its regimes of representation and AIDS on the other. The success of photography as a technology for and of image-making in the anchoring of hysteria had to do precisely with its confirmatory aspects. The latter enabled photography to succeed in the rapid expansion and assimilation within the discourses of knowledge and power. This structural congruence of different viewpoints (the eye of the photographer, the eye of the camera, and the spectator's eye), in photography cover a quality of pure, but delusory presence.13 When Abigail Solomon-Godeau is analyzing the mechanisms internal to the media apparatus in question - photography - she claims that the most important among them is the "reality effect". She claims that "a further structuring instance lies in the perspective system of representation built into camera optics in photography's infancy".14 "The world is no longer an 'open and unbound horizon'. Limited by the framing, lined up, put at the proper distance, the world offers itself up as an object endowed with meaning, an intentional object, implied by and implying the action of the 'subject' which sights it."15 We have to accept that there are ideological effects inherent to the photographic apparatus, and that these effects influence relations, scopic commands, and the confirmation or displacement of subject positions. In conclusion to the first established connection between representation, photography and hysteria, we can state that the fusion of physical presence and juridical absence in the photographs of the hysterics also offers a counter-reading. On the one side, this specific institution of the subject within the visible was possible or was the result of the specific ideological mechanisms of the optical truth intrinsic to the photographic apparatus. On the other side, this same apparatus reinforced the position of juridical absence of the insane person. As Pierre Bourdieu commented, discussing the social uses of photography: "In stamping photography with the patent of realism, society does nothing but confirm itself in the tautological certainty that an image of reality that conforms to its own representation of objectivity is truly objective".16 II. AIDS: Physical Absence and Juridical Presence The persons afflicted with AIDS show horrible visual signs of bodily deterioration: the disintegration of the skin, sarcomas, blindness and the degeneration of the body as a whole. Jarman has incorporated into the film his personal blindness, the consequences of him dying of AIDS, depicting this with the blue canvas; the zero degree of representation. Jarman moved from the disintegration of film structure to that of the viewer's sight. The institution of the subject ill with AIDS within the visible is carried out by the absence of a "truly ill body". Moreover Derek Jarman not only refused to reiterate the conventional pieties surrounding representations of a HIV positive person, but brought to light, paraphrasing Sally Stein, the hidden agendas inscribed in the particular mode of representation of our culture and times.17 In the film Blue this is carried out less by the aid of the medium used - the film, than with the strategically incorporated logic of the visualization of new media and of the regime of visibility carried out by new media technologies. In the film Blue, Jarman successfully conveys the complexities underpinning information systems and various subject positions with the way in which meaning and identities are constructed and endlessly re-negotiated.With the instauration of blindness in the film as the zero degree of representation, Jarman subverts some of the basic parameters of the new paradigm of visuality produced by the new technology and the position of the eyewitness within it. Today all methods of proving a statement depend on technological instruments and tools, and the constitution of scientific "truth" is, to a profound degree, mediated by technology. 18 Pragmatic acceptance of axioms and specific methods of proof have entered a variety of sciences. Scientific statements have to be effectuated and are thus decisively mediated by technology. Pragmatic performativity is the postmodern sense of truth.19 Lyotard emphasizes repeatedly the increase of scientific knowledge through its mediation with technology. The whole process of seeing through is in its mediation through technology.20 Let me clarify this process "of seeing through its mediation through technology" by returning for a moment to photography - summarizing its inner principle by relying on Paul Virilio, despite the fact that he was not referring to photography: "Everything I see is in principle within my reach, at least within reach of my sight, marked on the map of the ' can'."21 Photography enables the encoding of a topographical memory by establishing a dialectical loop between seeing and mapping. As Virilio claims, it is possible to speak of generations of vision and even of visual heredity from one generation to the next. But, following Virilio22 the perception developed by new media and technologies (which is called the "logistics of perception"), destroyed these earlier modes of representation preserved in the "I can" of seeing. The logistics of perception inaugurates the production of a vision machine and though the possibility of achieving sightless vision, whereby the video camera or virtual technology would be controlled by a computer. Today new media apparatuses (from virtual reality to cyberspace) confer upon us a whole range of visual prosthetics which confront us with an ever changing positioning of the subject with his/her body along with the systematic "production" of blindness, of the absence of certainty (of the naked human eye) within the visibility of our world. As Virilio would say, the bulk of what I see is no longer within my reach. We have to ask ourselves: What does one see when one's eyes, depending on such instruments, are reduced to a state of rigid and practically invariable structural immobility? However, this is only one side of the paradigm of the new media technology. On the other side, in the twentieth century, the sciences are increasingly permeated with technology. "Technological instruments and apparatuses hold a central role within scientific research processes. These technological tools, however, cost huge amounts of money. Consequently, the state and political institutions function as important and decisive mediators in the accomplishment of scientific knowledge. The process of knowledge is increasingly judged in terms of input (quantity) and output (quality). Science is linked to the system of political power".23 The blindness of the naked human eye is thus paradoxically reinforced by the growing tendency of using increasingly sophisticated electronic technologies not only in science but also in the leading ideological and repressive state apparatuses, particularly within the legal system and the police sector. Virilio is speaking of hyper-realist representational models within the police and the legal systems, to the extent that human witnesses are losing their credibility: the human eye no longer remains an eyewitness. On the one side of the paradigm of new media technology we are witnessing the systematic production of blindness, and on the other, the frightening hyper-realism of a system of total visibility which is particularly reinforced in legal and police procedures. The tendency of the leading scopic regime of the new media technologies is to produce blindness while, simultaneously, develops a whole range of techniques to produce the