Issa Clubb (by way of rachel greene) on Mon, 8 Dec 1997 16:24:18 +0100 (MET) |
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<nettime> RHIZOME_RAW: The Execution of Code in Many-Bodied, Black BoxStates |
A Review of Donna J. Haraway's,"Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium.FemaleManŠ_Meets_OncoMouse" + + + The Execution of Code in Many-Bodied, Black Box States Since consciousness and thought are entirely physical products of your brain and nervous system--and since your brain arrived fully imprinted at birth--what makes you think you have free will? Tom Wolfe, http://www.forbes.com/asap/120296/html/tom_wolfe.htm The notion of code popularly fetishized in the concept of the gene could not be more destructive. In the essay cited above, Tom Wolfe, along the way excoriating the 'deterministic' theories of Freud and Marx, comes to celebrate a determinism stronger than either could have stomached. "Freudianism and Marxism--and with them, the entire belief in social conditioning--were demolished so swiftly, so suddenly, that neuroscience has surged in, as if into an intellectual vacuum." And later: "The genetic fix is in." Within the sociobiological argument the "genome" stands as an incontrovertible black box, a kernel of ROM at the heart of every human -- in a word, code, and our lives simply its execution. "I have heard neuroscientists theorize that, given computers of sufficient power and sophistication, it would be possible to predict the course of any human being's life moment by moment, including the fact that the poor devil was about to shake his head over the very idea." In Wolfe's airtight enclosing of what are in truth raging scientific and cultural debates (speaking of "intellectual vacuums"), one can almost see the double helix being used to sew up dissent. But, in one of the double helix's curious inside-out manoeuvers, we find it elsewhere working to unravel this play for the illusion of consensus. Donna J. Haraway's most recent book, "Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium.FemaleManŠ_Meets_OncoMouse" (Routledge, 1997), performs Wolfe the service of returning his repressed, using the various concepts of "fetish" as elaborated by Marx, Freud, and A.N. Whitehead to unpack the reification going on in discussions of the gene. "Gene fetishists 'forget' that the gene and gene maps are ways of enclosing the commons of the body ... in specific ways, which, among other things, often put commodity fetishism into the program of biology..." But Haraway, due to her ethic of only analyzing "that which I love and only that in which I am deeply implicated", does not simply attempt to wipe out the concept of the gene as reactionary, as a priori fetishisized. Instead, she refigures it: "The processes 'inside' bodies -- such as the cascades of action that constitute an organism or that constitute the play of genes and other entities that go to make up a cell -- are interactions, not frozen things. For humans, a word like /gene/ specifies a multifaceted set of interactions among people and nonhumans in historically contingent, practical, knowledge-making work. A gene is not a thing, much less a 'master molecule' or a self-contained code." The implications of such logic are far-reaching, forcing us to revisit (rather than reinforce) prepackaged notions about gender, race, reproduction and even the boundaries between species. Under the pressure of a well-informed feminism, the genome no longer resembles a rationalized bird feeder, dispensing hard and fast answers to the grateful scientists who have fought for the exclusive right to peck at it. Instead genetics becomes part of living tissues of codes which interpenetrate technoscientific subjects. Here is Haraway's overarching interest -- "a project to excavate something like a technoscientific unconscious, the processes of formation of the technoscientific subject, and the reproduction of this subject's structures of pleasure and anxiety" -- and I would argue that in the current climate of new media and the Net, such an excavation is urgently needed. Urgently? Wolfe begins his breathless hype of genetic determinism by proclaiming it the Next Big Thing over the head of Louis Rossetto and the Digital Revolution. However one may feel about _Wired_, the danger of its politics pales in comparison to the potentially eugenecist fascism lurking behind images of hardwired criminals and in the theses of _The Bell Curve_ (a book Wolfe seems at best ambivalent about). And the Net surfer at large seems more interested in a sort of terrible-twos libertarianism, with a surfeit of free will and (ideally) venture capital. But of course being subject to determinism is always for the other guy, or more properly for the 'herds' -- we write the code which the others must simply follow. They become 'users', a word which never loses its connotations of dope addicts and strung-out passivity. And one wonders if there isn't an unconscious belief among geneticists that discovery of the 'life code' will somehow exempt them from having to execute it in their own bodies -- both meanings of the word 'execute' being intended in this instance. The ultimate point is that the oft-heard distinction between information 'haves' and 'have nots' already accepts the idea that information is a thing to be had, rather than a process to be created and controlled. Pretty much everyone in so-called developed societies, and many to most in so-called developing ones, lives within this process. The nature of 'technoscientific subjectivity' comes down to the ability, if not to write the code administering one's life, then at least to force oneself into the feedback loop governing its development. (See here Haraway's discussion of Aboriginal responses to the Human Genome Diversity Project; also feminist gynecological self-examination collectives.) Thus it's rather a continuum where on one end people produce information, and on the other they 'are had' by it. Those of you who have already followed the link to Wolfe's article will have noticed a certain slippage. I've written almost entirely of "genetic determinism", the "genome", etc., while Wolfe seems to think his article is about neuroscience. The distinction is important, because while his essay begins with functional Magnetic Resource Imaging, a brain scanning technique, it is the genes which determine intelligence and personality: "The vast majority of neuroscientists believe the genetic component of an individual's intelligence is remarkably high.... your genes are what really make the difference. The recent ruckus over Charles Murray and Richard Hernstein's _The Bell Curve_ is probably just the beginning of the bitterness the subject is going to create." (Notice that here the bitterness seems to be on the side of people who can't accept the truth of genetic determinism, and therefore, it seems to follow, the 'truth' of _The Bell Curve_. Notice also the supple statistical intelligence on display in the first sentence.) Interestingly, having chosen 'neuroscience' as his subject, Wolfe ignores the major development of contemporary neuroscience: the neural network. It's not hard to see why -- the notion that our brains are self-organized in webs of weighted connections, which massively change during development and whose number dwarfs the mathematical possibilities of gene combinations, certainly doesn't fit in with Wolfe's "genetic fix". While admitting to a certain degree of oversimplification, I would argue that it is precisely in neuroscience, with its models of elastic, contingent networks of meaning, that genetic determinism receives its strongest qualification. But it's also here that Haraway isn't quite able to get us out of our jam. At a central point in _Modest_Witness_, she uses hypertext as a metaphor for her 'pragmatics' or method, which involves the ability to laterally skip across disciplines. At the same time she is uncomfortable with her own metaphor because it doesn't specify which connections are valuable; it lacks a political ethics for creating one connection instead of another. So she's forced to "splice" it to the biological concept of the "totipotent stem cell", which are "those cells in an organism which retain the capacity to differentiate into any kind of cell." Thus at a crucial moment in the development of her methodology she abandons the metaphors of tissues and networks in favor of, in Deleuzian terms, an arborescent stem. (That neural networks, with their connections weighted by experience and repetition, might have provided a model of connectionism which could potentially incorporate an ethics directly into the workings of its structure, will have to remain a suggestion here.) The problem with this development in _Modest_Witness_ can best be seen in the paintings by Lynn Randolph, which are interspersed throughout the text, and which were apparently realized with a great deal of input from Haraway. Clearly they represent one part of an overall project to break apart the linearity of the text. Setting aside the question of whether or not the paintings are, um, ugly, we can see that they operate by gathering Haraway's patchworks of meaning into almost allegorical tableaux. The end result is that the paintings seem to hardwire Haraway's ideas -- such that the images 'execute' Haraway's 'code', their meaning fully (pre-)determined. The figures seem to float, weightless, outside of contingency, ambiguity, connection -- even if Haraway's expositions suggest otherwise. One experiences this effect even more strongly in contrast to Haraway's readings of biotech ads from science trade magazines, where the image becomes a point of intersection for multiple, competing discourses. Perhaps these discourses are not 'competing' so much as exerting (historical) pressure on each other, which is exactly what the figures in Randolph's images do *not* seem to be doing. If we can agree that Wolfe uses concepts of code and execution to freeze in place a reactionary determinism, and to preempt arguments which would exert pressure on this position, then surely the alternative project, a sort of thawing out of the technoscientific subject, needs to insist upon a different model of information production. For the most part Haraway's book does a remarkable job of constructing a working version of this model. In the current climate of the so-called Information Age, where information is breezily termed a 'commodity', she reminds us of the processes, pressures, and constraints experienced and created by technoscientific subjects which in fact produce this medium. _______________________ Issa Clubb Voyager Art Dept. mailto:issa@voyagerco.com + + + -> RHIZOME INTERNET -> post: list@rhizome.com -> questions: info@rhizome.com -> answers: http://www.rhizome.com + + + Subscribers to RHIZOME RAW are subject to all of the terms and conditions set out in the Subscriber Agreement available online at <http://www.rhizome.com>. --- # distributed via nettime-l : no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a closed moderated mailinglist for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: majordomo@icf.de and "info nettime" in the msg body # URL: http://www.desk.nl/~nettime/ contact: nettime-owner@icf.de