Inke Arns on Sun, 02 Jan 2000 13:32:50 +0100 |
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Syndicate: (2) Ethnicizing and Natosevic - the war and the lef |
[continued from mail no.1] >This dynamic stems from the fact that said powers have some common >interests indeed, but those interests can be too similar - in the sense >of a competition for spheres of influence. A strong motive for the USA, >but also for the Netherlands and England, is maintaining NATO as a >hegemonic military power. For the USA the main interest is to perpetuate >the US role as the protector of the European post-war order. For the >Netherlands and England the presence of the USA is desirable for >counterbalancing German or rather German-French dominance in EU >structures. Germany and even more so France do indeed have an interest >in the continued existence of NATO, but not as a hegemonic power that >restricts them in their power-strategic options. In their view, NATO >should be cut back to an alliance among others, alongside EUropean >structures that allow EUrope under the leadership of Germany and France >a certain autonomy from US-American interests. > >In order to save a NATO that has become quite useless after the Cold >War, NATO needs a war in which it can prove that it is needed. This, >however, does not yet explain why this war is waged against Yugoslavia. >In this the motives of the various powers probably differ. An >interesting point - only in the German discussion, along with that in >Austria and in German-language areas of Switzerland, is Germany >perceived and described as an imperialist power pushing towards the >south-east. The investment policy of Germany since 1989 has been better >known for its orientation towards Russian markets and for a relative >disinterest in the Balkans. Is the emphasis on German imperialist >efforts by some activists in Germany shaped by an anti-German[7] >overrated perception of "oneself" (all bad things come from Germany)? Or >is rather a lack of information about the ins and outs of the German >foreign policy in other languages responsible for the omissions >regarding Germany in discussions outside the German-language area? Some >indications (the tip of an iceberg?) of German interests and power games >do exist. Most widely known are the diplomatic initiatives of >Hans-Dietrich Genscher in favor of the international recognition of the >independence of Slovenia and Croatia that provided (unintentionally?) >substantial help to Milosevic's strategy of clinging to power, based on >ethnicizing social questions. Already in the first phase of dislocating >the Yugoslav state structure by means of war the demonizing of Serbs was >accompanied by common interests of the German foreign and the Yugoslav >domestic politics - much like today between NATO and the Yugoslav >central government. A point which received less attention than >Genscher's Yugoslavia politics but has nevertheless found its way into >non-German media is some evidence that the KLA has been supported, in an >early phase, by the German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND - Federal >Information Service) and other German secret services, and was armed by >German institutions against the will of the US-American CIA.[8] > >In any event, the escalation strategy in its final phase seems to have >taken place under US leadership. It may be difficult to find out whether >the US government was pushed to take over by the facts created on the >ground by German efforts towards an escalation, in order to avert an >excessive EUropean autonomy, or whether the USA took steps towards >making a diplomatic solution impossible due to its own interests in the >disintegration of what was left of Yugoslavia. In any case, the US >government came to the conclusion that a war under NATO/US leadership >worked more effectively towards maintaining its influence than >diplomatic attempts at defusing the war preparations pushed ahead by >German and Yugoslav policies. > >In an effort to explore the interests of various powers, it seems >appropriate to me to start out with the observed consequences of the >NATO attacks and to try to imagine who might benefit from those >consequences, who might have accepted them grudgingly and who will >clearly suffer from them. I do not imagine that every single consequence >can be assigned to a willful strategy. But I do think that most of the >consequences were very easy to predict and may therefore, in the view of >one or the other actor and under the given circumstances, have >contributed to making the escalation strategy attractive or, on the >contrary, to raising skepticism about such a strategy. > >Among the obvious consequences of the NATO attacks that will, in my >opinion, have to be analyzed in future discussions, are (in no >particular order) > >* the political strengthening of Milosevic and the elimination of any >inner-Yugoslav opposition. Specifically, the war, like the wars in >Croatia and Bosnia before it, provides Milosevic with a perfect >explanation why the promises of a better life for the population will >not be realized - it is war, after all. If an issue out of the current >demonizing discourse can be found, it is possible that the reasserted >power position of Milosevic may pave the way for a regional order in >which NATO assigns him the role of a co-guarantor of the regional >stability - at conditions conforming to NATO and IMF plans; > >* a massive provocation towards the Russian leadership that can be >interpreted as an attempted revival of the politics of containment >followed by NATO/the US towards the "Soviet" Union during the times of >the Cold War. This may have been part of a scheme to evaluate the >resistance likely to be opposed by the Russian leadership to the ongoing >US policies aimed at directly disputing the sphere of influence of the >Russian government around the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus; > >* the liberation of Germany from the military isolation imposed by the >post-war order, by breaking the taboo of a Bundeswehr (the army of >Federal Germany) intervention against Yugoslavia. This may have been the >single greatest motive of German politics to enter into a war against >Yugoslavia within the NATO framework. After this tactical use, NATO has >served its main purpose as a hegemonic power and Germany, together with >France, may further on prefer to cut back NATO to the role of a military >alliance among several others; > >* the confirmation of US supremacy, including over EUropean "defense" >policies, through the leading role taken by the US government in the >NATO bombings. This situation could easily swing around to a substantial >loss of US-American power over the EUropean "defense" system, however. >Germany has become more independent by breaking out of the military >isolation and is more susceptible to accept French offers for a military >collaboration in the context of the Western European Union (WEU). >Furthermore there is a danger of NATO being discredited to the extent >that the reasons given for the intervention are in obvious contradiction >to the consequences of the bombings - to the detriment of the US and to >the benefit of the German and French governments; > >* the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, mostly Kosov@ >Albanians, from Kosov@, with two far-reaching consequences: a massive >migration of refugees to neighboring countries and in more or less >controlled ways[9] to Western European countries as cheap and extremely >dependent labor; the destabilizing of Albania and Macedonia that in >essence turns those two countries into NATO protectorates. In addition, >one can be sure that the massive expulsion of Albanians precipitated by >the NATO bombings was envisaged by NATO strategic planning to serve as >the heart of its own war-mongering discourse of legitimation; > >* also in connection with the mass expulsions, the destruction of the >subsistence structures which stood in the way of capital accumulation by >providing an alternative to being exploited at low wages. This time, the >destruction of social structures aimed especially at the Kosov@ Albanian >clans. In the context of the past Yugoslav civil wars such destruction >has been identified as a substantial interest in war for the Yugoslav >leadership under the pressure of IMF programs (see Materialien Nr. 6). >The destruction of subsistence structure is thus in the interest of both >Milosevic and the Western powers; > >* at least a temporary weakening of the EUropean economy as compared to >the US-American. This has become visible through the low exchange rate >of the Euro to the US dollar. Presumably, US strategists do not mind >waging a war in EUrope's backyard and imposing the consequences of a >possible destabilization on their greatest economic competitor and >NATO-partner; > >* the destruction of substantial parts of the Yugoslav industry and >infrastructure that have been the target of bombings far more often than >military installations. A reconstruction based on foreign loans will >make Yugoslavia economically dependent for a long time to come and force >it to pay interests. Much like in Kuwait, thanks to its leading role in >the war the US government is likely to position US companies well in the >business of reconstruction. Even as the German diplomacy is trying to >grab the initiative by proposing a "Marshall Plan for the Balkans", it >will be hard for the EU to be more than a junior partner to the US. In >case such a Marshall Plan turns the dependence of Yugoslavia on loans in >a dependence on the "donor countries", this will be just another >opportunity for the latter to implement a redistribution from the bottom >to the top. Tax money will serve to finance the profits of (US and >German) transnationals in Yugoslavia; > >* a military-Keynesian solution of parts of the overproduction crisis in >the US, and to a smaller extent in the EU, through the massive use (the >"consumption" paid through taxes) of weapons. This has the side effect >of providing a gigantic live weapons show as a state subsidized >advertising opportunity for transnational arms companies; > >* a solution to the question of where the US soldiers thus far stationed >in Germany should go, if they haven't already been transferred to Iraq, >or later to Bosnia. With the de facto NATO protectorates in Macedonia >and Albania and the planned protectorate in Kosov@ (according to Annex B >of the Rambouillet agreement in all of Yugoslavia) there is now >sufficient work for those soldiers otherwise threatened with >unemployment; > >* an increased pressure on the state governments of the region to act in >accordance with their candidacy for NATO accession, and test runs for >NATO loyalty. The Bulgarian government for instance was - as Bulgarian >media commented - not asked to provide an air corridor to NATO planes >for any war strategic use, but in order to test the political >willingness of bowing to the will of NATO against the will of the >population; > >* the fact that the acceptance for a division or separation of Kosov@, >and in the medium term maybe of Macedonia, has grown internationally. If >we examine the main argument given for the inalterability of state >borders, namely the fear that other minorities in Europe might follow >the example of the Kosov@ Albanians, we notice that this argument loses >its stringency if the price of their sovereignty becomes so high that >anyone who might fancy to walk in their footsteps would be thoroughly >discouraged. This paves the way for the continuation of the splitting up >of the Balkans according to "ethnic" criteria, or whatever criteria may >suit the economic and geostrategic interests of the Western powers; > >* a strengthened KLA leadership. In this context we can expect that >especially the US, after the weakening of Yugoslavia and Macedonia, will >not risk the creation of a Greater Albania under the leadership of the >KLA or other forces. It would therefore not be surprising if the KLA was >used as cannon-fodder and thus wiped out in the war - for instance by >being armed so as to serve as ground troops of NATO and being sent to >fight an overwhelmingly stronger Yugoslav army.[10] Albania is useful >for the US as a submissive and extremely dependent state government. If >however a self-assured Kosov@ Albanian leadership emerges from the war >in full strength and kicks off a dynamic of independence, this does not >lie in the interest of the US government who wants especially to control >trade routes in the region and to that end needs obedient governments. >As opposed to Germany, that has, as we mentioned earlier, supported the >KLA at an early stage and apparently finds such a dynamic more >promising. > >Yugoslavia as a center of East-West trade > >The importance of East-West trade routes stems from the already >mentioned US interests in an enlargement of the US sphere of influence >coinciding with a containment of the Russian influence around the >Caspian Sea and the Caucasus. Thinking one step further, it is also >about the revival of the old silk route all the way to China, with the >important detail that Russia is to be bypassed, but at the same time >alternatives are to be created to the Turkish route in order to take the >edge off Turkey's crucial strategic importance. Since I have not yet >seen these trade strategic reflections expounded in a publicly available >source, and since the US hegemony in the Atlantic Alliance continues >despite all the wounds incurred, I would like to elaborate on this a >bit. > >An essential reason why the lack of submissiveness and reliability (seen >from a Western-imperialist perspective) of the Yugoslav government was >so annoying was that trade routes that are important for the future pass >through Yugoslavia with practically no alternative and thus depend on >the goodwill of the Yugoslav government. In circles dealing with >investment strategies Yugoslavia is seen as a country that (both before >and after 1989) has misused its geographic position in order to control >trade routes - both the overland route from Bulgaria and Macedonia >through Belgrade to the West and the Danube shipping route. NATO >strategists could have a good laugh about such attempts at monopolizing >if they had ready alternatives. Besides the route going through the >Bosporus, where in the case of oil, for instance, the limits of capacity >have already been reached and substantial ecological danger and logistic >problems are arising, alternatives to the route through Belgrade or the >Danube have not been developed. > >However, the current trade policies of the Western powers, and >especially of the US, build upon the notion that a multitude of >alternatives should be opened in order to reduce dependencies. If it had >been possible to develop these alternatives earlier the Yugoslav >government would have been missing an essential trump card and would >have been much more exposed to Western attempts at intimidation and >threats of embargo. Then, the "Yugoslav nut" might possibly have been >cracked without a war. Even if for the NATO countries there was a whole >set of other reasons for escalating towards a war, the probability that >sufficient support for the war might have been assured would have been >substantially lower. The development in good time of alternative trade >routes was hindered both by diverging priorities among Western powers >and mutually incompatible transport policies of the Balkan countries, >combined with a lack of funds for infrastructure investment. In order >for foreign investment to flow, the unwritten trade rules of the Balkan >countries, which are not understandable to Western businesspeople, had >to be abolished. The difficulties of understanding stemmed mainly from >the fact that these rules were much too awkward for effectively imposing >Western profit interests. Through the policies of "development" banks >like the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and >Development (EBRD) those rules were substituted by a business system of >Western type that favors Western companies and essentially excludes the >local firms. > >The conditions for the development of trade routes are given by the >interplay between local/regional interests and the requirements of >interregional trade. The transport connections between Bulgaria and >Romania, for instance, which would provide a way to bypass Belgrade on >the way to the north-west, remain poor - only a single bridge far in the >East and a few ferries, for a border of no less than five hundred >kilometers. As long as the Bulgarian government insists on building the >new bridge in Vidin, 20 kilometers from the Yugoslav border, the >Romanian government will never agree. The latter has no interest in >developing trade over the Bulgarian-Romanian border, since the master >plan of Romanian transport politics is aimed at developing East-West >trade from the Romanian Black Sea port of Constanta to Hungary and >onwards. The construction of a new bridge over the Danube would open >Constanta to the competition of the Bulgarian ports of Varna and Burgas. >Hence the interest of Western powers - in this case not so much the US >as Germany and Austria - in alternative routes and flexibility will be >realized only if the Romanian government can be offered sufficient >compensation. The war of NATO against Yugoslavia now offers a coercive >environment in which the Romanian government may be brought to agree to >a bridge, as long as its location ensures that the traffic through >Romania - and not only through a small corner in the west between >Bulgaria and Hungary - is developed. Furthermore a bridge further away >from the Yugoslav border could satisfy the needs of two trade routes, >namely - besides the one mentioned - a south-north route from Turkey and >Greece whose inclusion in such a project would make it interregionally >more attractive and would make the investments more profitable. > >For the United States another overland route is of much higher >geostrategic importance - corridor VIII. This corridor runs from the >Black Sea through Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania to the Mediterranean >and is part of the transport political priorities of all three of these >countries. The aim of US politics is to bring it under the control of >international institutions and its advisors. This foreign interest suits >the three Balkan countries to the extent that they are hoping it will >help them break out of a transport political isolation - Albania is >completely isolated towards the east, Macedonia is connected only >towards the north and the south, and Bulgaria is too dependent on >Yugoslavia to the west. In contrast to some of the other EUropean >corridors, corridor VIII does not play a significant role on an >intra-EUropean level (its "integrative force" is low for EUrope, say >analysts who are close to investment circles). The corridor VIII >receives its full strategic significance only when it is seen as part of >an outreaching route leading to the Caspian Sea and further on to China. >For the USA this corridor is therefore of outstanding importance, and >the weakened governments of Albania and Macedonia (a significant >consequence of the war moves of NATO) come just in time as forcibly >obedient servants of US politics. Besides this, Bulgaria is not known >for its affirmed independence from Western institutions, since it has >been made dependent through Western loans and through the tactical >promise that it will catch up to a Western standard of living by joining >NATO and the EU.[11] > >A trade corridor running through easily controlled countries offers the >US the opportunity to reduce its dependency on current trade routes >through Turkey and Greece and to get a tighter grip on its two NATO >partners. On an economic level, the direct winner would be Italy, which >would profit from the fact that Albania, through which the goods would >transit and reach the Mediterranean, does not itself have the necessary >infrastructure to serve as a distribution center for goods and raw >materials arriving from the East. > >The corridor VIII does not run directly through Kosov@, even if the most >likely route runs as close as 20 kilometers from the Macedonian border >to Kosov@. The war of NATO against Yugoslavia can certainly not be >explained exclusively from the fact that the US have an interest in >controlling trade routes and playing one route against the other. Such >an aim would never have found the approval of the NATO partner >countries. Notably in matters of the development of trade routes, the >interests of Germany and the United States diverge substantially. What >they do have in common is that Yugoslavia is to be bypassed if possible. >For the US - to the south towards the Mediterranean. For Germany - to >the north. Nevertheless, for parts of the US establishment the corridor >VIII, in addition to the search for a legitimation of NATO as police >unit, is likely to have been an important part of their strategic >thinking. And more generally, the powerful position of the Yugoslav >government stemming from its control over the trade routes developed so >far was certainly on the agenda of German and other strategizing >meetings. > >Invitation > >The reflections on a possible radical leftist approach to the war of >NATO against Yugoslavia and that of the Yugoslav leadership against the >Kosov@ Albanians and on possible ways to revive arguments based on >economic and social power interests that were presented in this article >are sketchy, incomplete and not sufficiently well thought-out to give us >the tools to act. In fact, they are meant rather as food for thought and >action, as a possible starting point for further discussions and the >search for appropriate forms of action and communication. I would be >happy if readers who are interested in participating in such a process >contacted me.[12] > > >NOTES > >1 The spelling Kosov@ is chosen in the tradition of the gender-neutral >Spanish spelling which combines the alternatives "a" and "o" into the @ >sign. This provides a way of avoiding having to choose between the >partisan spellings Kosovo (the Serb neuter stemming from the historical, >nationalistically tainted name of the place "Kosovo Polje", which >translates to "Field of the Blackbirds") and Kosova (its variant used in >Albanian language). > >2 Both e-mail lists can be subscribed to by sending e-mail to ><majordomo@zamir.net> with the command "subscribe ex-yu-a-lista" or >"subscribe attack", respectively, in the body of the e-mail. Most of the >contributions are in "the language we speak", as Yugoslavs sometimes >call the South-Slavic language that has by now received separate names >according to nationalist interests, and sometimes also in English. > >3 Ethnisierung des Sozialen - Die Transformation der jugoslawischen >Gesellschaft im Medium des Krieges. Materialien für einen neuen >Antiimperialismus Nr. 6, Berlin/Göttingen 1993. (Ethnicizing the social >fabric - The transformation of the Yugoslav society in the medium of >war. Materials for a new Anti-Imperialism) > >4 Marcel Noir: "Unser Mann in der OSZE". (Our man in OSCE) In: Jungle >World, 14 April 1999. > >5 Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, >Rambouillet, France - 23 February 1999. And especially its Appendix B: >Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force. Available on the >Web at <http://www.law.pitt.edu/kosovo.htm>. > >6 Boris Buden: "The official Bastard (ARKZIN)-statement on the war in >Yugoslavia - Saving Private Havel", 20 April 1999. > >7 The anti-Germans are a faction of the German left that has had the >merit to reintroduce important historical questions (especially the >relation to historical Nazism) into the political discussion but >sometimes tends to take Germany and its importance too seriously in an >almost narcissistic sense. > >8 Roger Faligot: "How Germany backed KLA". In: The European, 21 >September 1998. > >9 Note added at translation: As shown by Helmut Dietrich, another effect >of the war is that through the presence of NATO troops in Albania and >Macedonia where most of the refugees transited made it possible to >successfully isolate the refugees and prevent them from making contact >with people who could help them pass the borders into Italy and on to >Switzerland and Germany. An even tighter control was made possible by >the fact that the refugee camps are under NATO supervision. Cf. Helmut >Dietrich, "Europäische Flüchtlingspolitik und der NATO-Krieg - Die >Zerschlagung der Fluchtwege aus dem Balkan nach Westeuropa" (European >Refugee Politics and the NATO war - The dismantling of flight routes >from the Balkans to Western Europe), Widerspruch No. 37 (July 1999), >Zurich, Switzerland. > >10 Note added at translation: Although as predicted here, soon after the >publication of this article an outright anti-KLA propaganda started in >the world media, it seems that the position of the KFOR (Kosovo Force) >command towards the KLA structures is more ambiguous than I had >supposed, and the KLA leadership is given the opportunity to ascertain >its power and - as Bulgarian media surmise and KLA officers openly admit >- position themselves for the next round of the struggle for a Greater >Albania. We had better keep an eye on developments in Macedonia. > >11 In the context of NATO interests in corridor VIII it may be >interesting to note that Salomon Passi, the chairman of the Atlantic >Clubs in Sofia, an association which de facto represents the interests >of NATO, has served as an intermediate in the negotiations for an >infrastructure deal between a US-American company and the port >authorities of Burgas. > >12 My e-mail address: <kessi@bitex.com>; Tel/Fax: +359-2-980 96 52. ------Syndicate mailinglist-------------------- Syndicate network for media culture and media art information and archive: http://www.v2.nl/syndicate to unsubscribe, write to <syndicate-request@aec.at> in the body of the msg: unsubscribe your@email.adress